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CUMMINGS v. STATE
therefore, not subject to the application of the doctrine of
advancements.
However, the principal case does not fall within the
usual advancement situation where property is trans-
ferred to a child by one parent. In the instant case, both
the husband and wife joined in the execution of the deed
to the defendant. Although neither spouse, acting alone,
had the power to convey or encumber any interest in the
property held by the entireties, 6 the co-tenants, acting to-
gether and voluntarily, could validly alienate such prop-
erty. Therefore, the deed executed by both spouses which
named defendant as the grantee transferred an alienable
estate.
The Court of Appeals, however, based its decision upon
the absence of the prerequisite of inheritability in the in-
stant case. While this factor is lacking in any case where
parties hold property by the entireties, and the Court was
correct in its application of the theoretical aspect of the
law, ancient technicalities should not be employed to bind
all future decisions in this area of advancements. The
Court, in the proper case, should find an advancement, if
the policy prerequisites for an advancement are other-
wise present,38 notwithstanding the fact that property was
held by the entireties and therefore not technically in-
heritable. Where the intent to make an advancement is
clear on the part of both spouses, this intent should be
given effect. If not, the policy of the legislature to provide
for equality of distribution among the heirs of the in-
testate will be defeated.
DANIEL F. THOMAS
Deliberation And Premeditation In First Degree Murder
Cummings v. State'
An intimate, clandestine relationship had developed
between defendant and decedent, and they often took long
automobile trips together. On July 28, 1960, the decedent
drove from Chicago with her sister to the home of rela-
Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941); Sloan v. Jones, 192
Tenn. 400, 241 S.W. 2d 506, 25 A.L.R. 1235 (1951); also see 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 430.
Supra, n. 29.
8 Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163 (1932); also see 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 436.
See Elbert, op. cit. 8upra, n. 4.
1223 Md. 606, 165 A. 2d 886 (1960).
1961]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tives in Baltimore. The defendant, who had expected to
make the trip with the decedent alone, followed in his
car the next day. Pursuant to plans made by telephone,
defendant met the decedent for breakfast early in the
morning of July 30, at a shopping center in Baltimore, but
the decedent hurried off saying she would meet defendant
later in the day. She returned at approximately 12:30
p.m., parked the station wagon she was driving near de-
fendant's Cadillac, and walked over to his car. The de-
fendant said he was tired and felt miserable and needed a
place to stay. When the decedent refused to show him a
place where he could rest or direct him to the route to
Chicago, a "heated" argument erupted. Defendant said
he was "finished." The decedent returned to her station
wagon, but went back to defendant's car in response to his
call. Then, angrily, she walked away, whereupon defend-
ant shot her in the back through the open window of his
automobile with a pistol which had rested on the front
seat of his car. He then got out of his car and shot her six
more times.
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder in
the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, sitting without a
jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial
court could have fairly concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had deliberated and premeditated,
and was, therefore, guilty of murder in the first degree.2
The first statute which graded murder was enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1794.1 It subsequently became a model
in many other jurisdictions for similar legislation, di-
viding murder into two degrees and limiting capital pun-
ishment to the higher degree.' The Pennsylvania Act pro-
vided "That all murder which shall be perpetuated by
means of . . .wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing
... shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all
s3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 407, provides: ". . . any kind of wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in 'the first degree."
'This note deals only with the elements of premeditation and deliberation;
wilfulness or specific intent to kill is assumed to be present. This third
-element is discussed in the course of the recent note, Assault with Intent
to Murder - Necessity for Actual Intent to Cause Death, 21 Md. L. Rev.
-254 (1961).
a CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) 608; HOCHHEIMER, THE
LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1904) 380; 1 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1957) 558, ROYAL COMMISSION, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1949-1953) 168; Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and the
Degree Device, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 274, 275 (1953) ; Keedy, A Problem
of First Degree Murder: Fisher v. United States, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267,
268 (1950).
' ROYAL COMMISSION, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 3.
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other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the
second degree .... "I
In view of the dictionary meanings of the words deliber-
ate and premeditated, those who drafted the statute un-
doubtedly had in mind that only those murders which
were thoughtfully conceived well in advance of the actual
killing would fall within the first degree category. How-
ever, shortly after the statute was passed the courts
proceeded to interpret it in derogation of the literal and
intended meanings of the words "deliberate and pre-
meditated,"7 and the usual formulation came to be made
in terms of whether there was sufficient time so that the
accused could have premeditated and deliberated.8 If he
could have done so, it was rather easily assumed that he
did, and the time in which premeditation and deliberation
is assumed possible is now almost everywhere taken to be
a very short period of time not often precisely identifiable,9
',ROYAL COMMISSION, loc. cit. supra, n. 3. Cf., 18 Purdon's PENNA. STAT.
ANNO. (1945) § 4701.
6 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW (1957) 74; ROYAL COMMISSION, OP. Cit. supra,
n. 3, 174; MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) 70. However, many
individuals have put forth the thesis that there should be no distinction
made between the methodical killer, whose crimes ordinarily would be
called first degree murder, and the impulsive killer, whose crimes would
be deemed second degree murder, as the former is just as dangerous to
society as the latter. In this respect see STEPHEN, 3 HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 94, wherein it is stated that "As much
cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others . . .is shown by sudden
as by premeditated murders."
I Deliberate means "to weigh in the mind; to consider the reasons for and
against; to consider maturely; to reflect upon; ponder." Premeditate means
"to think on and revolve in the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design
previously." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1955).
8 ROYAL COMsMISSION, op. cit. supra, n. 3, 184, quoting from Commonwealth
v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 16 (1868) :
"[T]he intention to kill is the essence of the offense. Therefore, if an
intention to kill exists, it is wilful; if this intention be accompanied
by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own
purpose and design, it is deliberate; and if suflcient time be afforded
to enable the mind fully to frame the design to kill, and to select the
instrument, or to frame the plan to carry this design into execution,
it is premeditated. The law fixes upon no length of time as necessary
to form the intention to kill . . . ." Emphasis supplied in part.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 366 Pa. 182, 76 A. 2d 608, 610
(1950), in dismissing defendant's assertion that the trial court erred be-
cause its instruction considered only whether he had time to deliberate and
premeditate, and not whether he did in fact deliberate and premeditate,
the Court said that:
"It was clearly correct to charge that if the intention to kill existed,
defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree. * * * There must,
of course, be sufficient time, however short it may actually be, for a
person to deliberate and premeditate in order to form that intent.
But those elements serve merely as guides for the jurors to prevent
them from finding an intent where none in fact could have existed."
91 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, n. 3, 563-564. In the instant case, supra,
n. 1, 611, it was stated that "[A]lthough the design to kill must precede
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although the mental capacity of the individual accused is
sometimes taken into account. 10 This severe dilution of the
natural and proper meanings of premeditation and de-
liberation has made it common for experts to say that in
many jurisdictions there is nothing substantial left of the
first degree requirement in this area except for a specific
intent to kill." The American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code states:
"[T]he courts . . . almost universally have held that
the criterion [premeditation and deliberation] reduces
to no more than a requirement of an intent to kill.
Neither calmness in the formation of a homicidal pur-
pose nor a substantial time between resolution and
action is generally held to be essential."' 2
Sometimes the judicial erosion of deliberation and
premeditation is restricted by the precise wording of a
statute."3 For example, in the New York homicide statute,
second degree murder is characterized as killing with a
the killing by some appreciable . . . time, that time need not be long."
Further, It was said that "(The triers of fact] may have decided . . .
[the defendant] formed his intent to kill shortly before he discharged the
first shot, and concluded that there was enough time for reflection and
decision between then and when he fired the last one . . . so as to con-
stitute premeditation .... ." (612).
In Mackiewlcz v. State, 114 So. 2d 684, 691 (Fla. 1959), the Court
said that "The fact that only an instant elapsed between [defendant's
discovery of his victim and defendant's fatal shot] . . . does not negative
a premeditated design to effect [his victim's] . . . death. It is not neces-
sary that such purpose and intent . . . shall exist for any particular
length of time.. .. "
It is stated in Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 62 S.E. 2d 28,
31 (1950), that although a deliberate and premeditated killing must be
predetermined upon consideration "that does not mean that a measurable
period of time for pondering must have elapsed. The intention to kill
may have come Into being only at the time of the killing and the act
still be first-degree murder. It is the will and purpose to kill and not the
interval of time which fixes the grade of the offense."
lInfra, n. 28.
Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Mur-
der, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759. 773-777 (1949). See also Brenner, supra, n. 3,
281; Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37
Col. L. Rev. 701, 707-708 (1937) and cases cited therein.
MoDrEL PENAL CODE, OP. Cit. 8upra, n. 6, 69.
'a 39 McKINNEY'S N.Y. STAT. (1944) Art. 94, § 1044, provides: first degree
murder is a killing with . . . a deliberate and premeditated design to
effect the death of the person killed. . . ." § 1046, provides: ". . . killing
of a human being is murder In the second degree when committed with
a design to effect . . . death . . . but without deliberation and premedi-
tation." Oregon's murder statutes are similar to New York's; see 1
ORE. REV. STAT. (1953) Title 16, Chs. 163.010 and 163.020. Although
Florida divides murder into three categories, the first and second degree
categories are essentially the same as New York's; see 22 FLA. STAT.
ANNO. (1941) Ch. 782, § 784.04.
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design to produce death but without accompanying de-
liberation and premeditation. 4 Because the statutory plan
would be rendered totally ineffectual if deliberation and
premeditation were construed to mean a "design to kill,"
the courts in that state have sometimes interpreted de-
liberation and premeditation more literally. Hence, in
People v. Guadagnino'5 it was declared:
"[Tihere is a marked distinction in the law between
deliberate premeditation and an intent to kill. * * *
[A jury charge] is therefore incorrect, which confuses
these things, and says that premeditation and delibera-
tion may be formed at the instant of the killing .... 16
Of the states in which statutory language less clearly
prevents the playing down of premeditation and delibera-
tion, California affords more than lip service to the strict
definitions." The literal denotations of the words have been
applied in that state to the extent that first degree murder
convictions have been reversed even when there has been
clearly present a design to cause death in the defendant's
mind previous to the fatal act." California has commonly
held that premeditation means "to think on and revolve in
the mind, beforehand; to contrive and design previously,"'19
and, also, "by cojoining the words 'wilful, deliberate, and
premeditated'. . . the legislature apparently emphasized its
intention to require ... substantially more reflection than
may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent
to kill. '20
Maryland appears to be committed to the usual con-
struction of the words deliberation and premeditation
which gives them little meaning. The following remark,
taken from HOCHHEIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW, 2' was cited in
139 M CKINNEY's N.Y. STAT. (1944) Art. 94, § 1046. See also ROYAL
COMMISSION, Op. cit. supra, n. 3, 185.
223 N.Y. 344, 135 N.E. 594 (1922).
" Id., 597.
1 California's murder statutes are comparable to the original Pennsyl-
vania statute aforementioned. See 47 WEST'S ANNo. CALIP. CODES (1955)
Title 8, Ch. 1, § 189.
I People v. Hillman, 140 Cal. App. 2d 902, 295 P. 2d 939 (1956) ; People
v. Bender, 27 Cal. 2d 164, 163 P. 2d 8 (1945).
1 People v. Rittger, 355 Cal. Rptr. 901, 355 P. 2d 645, 651 (1960) ; People v.
Parrott, 174 Cal. App. 2d 301, 344 P. 2d 643, 645 (1959); People v.
Keeling, 152 Cal. App. 2d 4, 312 P. 2d 407, 410 (1957) ; People v. Hillman,
supra, n. 18, 941; People v. Nichols, 88 Cal. App. 2d 221, 198 P. 2d 538,
542 (1948) ; People v. Bender, aupra, n. 18, 19; People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.
2d 880, 156 P. 2d 7, 18 (1945).
2 People v. Thomas, supra, n. 19.
1 HOCHEIMER, Zoo. cit. supra, n. 3.
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the instant case and had been previously quoted or para-
phrased in many other Maryland cases, "''[P]remeditated'
[means] the design must have preceded the killing by an
appreciable length of time, time enough to deliberate .... 22
However, it is evident that the Maryland Court of Appeals
has not given full effect to the statement in that it has not
required any calm or substantial reflection prior to the
killing.23
It is interesting to note that in a number of cases the
Court has even said that premeditation and deliberation
could have occurred between the time defendant began a
course of action, e.g., firing a series of shots, which resulted
in the victim's death and the time when the accused ceased
his conduct.24 This generally involves an assumption that
the victim was not immediately killed by one of the first
acts in the series. Premeditated and deliberate shots at a
man already dead have no significance on a charge of
first degree murder.
Kier v. State, 216 Md. 513, 523, 140 A. 2d 896 (1958) ; Elliott v. State,
215 Md. 152, 160, 137 A. 2d 130 (1957) ; Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249,
257, 126 A. 2d 858 (1956); Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 106, 95 A. 2d
577 (1953).
2 Where the defendant shot and killed a policeman in an alley as the
policeman preceeded him on their way to the station, the Court said that
"[Defendant had] time . .. to deliberate as he was being walked to the
police station and as he was taking the revolver from his pocket." Brown
v. State, 220 Md. 29, 39, 150 A. 2d 895 (1959).
Defendant assaulted a woman in her home, and the Court of Appeals
remarked that "[t]he brutal manner in which the victim was beaten ...
indicates a protracted period during which the assault continued. * * *
There was ample evidence ... that the action of the appellant was .. .de-
liberate, and ... premeditated." Kier v. State, supra, n. 22, 523.
Appellant watched deceased approach until within range, and then shot
and killed him with a shotgun. Defendant was held to have deliberated
and premeditated. Elliott v. State, 215 Md. 152, 137 A. 2d 130 (1957).
When defendant hit and killed the victim with a car, the Court stated
that "During the time . . . [appellant] drove the eight blocks with the
deceased under the car * * * Appellant . . .had sufficient time to pre-
meditate his actions . . " Faulcon v. State, supra, n. 22, 261.
The accused bludgeoned his victim to death, and the Court said: "There
was opportunity for reflection and decision . . . in the length of time
needed to get out of the car, pick up the piece of pipe, return to the
car, and strike the fatal blows." Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 225, 100
A. 2d 257 (1953).
Defendant, who had been drinking (and there was some question as
to whether he was drunk), shot his victim after a brief discussion as
to the ownership of some cigarettes. The Court of Appeals said that
"The jury could find that two or more shots were fired and that there
was an appreciable interval between the first shot and the second, or
more ... [and] the firing of two or more shots in such circumstances has
been held . . . to be evidence . . . of deliberation and premeditation."
Chisley v. State, supra, n. 22, 108.
Kier v. State, supra, n. 22; Faulcon v. State, 8upra, n. 22; Chisley v.
State, supra, n. 22.
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In all of the cases which have come before the Court
of Appeals where the defendant has contended that his
crime was not deliberate and premeditated, it has been
decided that the trier of fact could have reasonably de-
termined that the accused premeditated and deliberated.
The Court is presumedly loath to reduce a first degree
murder conviction to second degree murder in this area
because of Maryland Rule 741c which provides that "the
Court of Appeals may review ... to determine whether in
law the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction,
but the verdict of the trial court shall not be set aside on
the evidence, unless clearly erroneous . . . ." The Court
of Appeals has said that it must determine whether the trial
court could have found premeditation and deliberation, not
whether the Court itself would have found premeditation
and deliberation. 5
Since the prevailing theory is that very little time is
required for premeditation and deliberation, and since in
most cases the conduct of the accused prior to the event
does not make it absolutely clear just when he first formed
his intent to kill, it is usually very difficult, if the prose-
cution has pressed the charge, to direct a jury that it
cannot find first degree murder or to set aside such a ver-
dict as irrational if it is rendered. Perhaps the best hope
of the defense is that the jury will suppose premeditation
and deliberation to have their natural meanings, or exer-
cise its practically uncontrolled discretion to bring in a
second degree verdict, on the basis of intangible con-
siderations. Where, as in Maryland, trial judges are com-
monly the triers of fact in criminal cases, the harshness
of the interpretation given the original Pennsylvania-type
statute may be greater, since the trial judge probably
knows and attempts conscientiously to apply the artificially
narrow conception of premeditation and deliberation.
A related problem concerns the effect of intoxication
or of mental disorder short of legally exculpatory insanity
upon one's capacity to deliberate and premeditate. Many
states reasonably hold that inebriation may negative the
presence of the state of mind necessary for the accused to
have been capable of acting in a deliberate and premedi-
tated manner.2 6 In Chisley v. State2" it was said that volun-
"Cummings v. State, 8upra, n. 1, 610; Kier v. State, supra, n. 22, 518;
Grammer v. State, supra, n. 23. See also Dunn v. State. Md. 174
A. 2d 185, 191 (1961).
"CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) 614; Keedy, supra, n. 3
273 (citing cases from twenty jurisdictions).
202 Md. 87, 106, 95 A. 2d 577 (1953). Subsequently, In Breeding v.
State, 220 Md. 193, 199, 151 A. 2d 743 (1959), the Court of Appeals
1961]
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tary intoxication "must be considered by the jury as it
bears on the question of ... deliberation and premedita-
tion. ..."
The cases are nearly evenly divided as to whether a
mental disturbance short of legally recognized insanity
may be considered in deciding whether defendant com-
mitted a murder with deliberation and premeditation."
One frequently discussed case in this area is Fisher v.
United States," where a majority of the Supreme Court of
the United States held that the defendant, who evidently
had psychopathic tendencies and borderline mental de-
ficiency, was to be judged, concerning his capacity to
deliberate and premeditate, by a "theoretical normality,"3
and not by his own traits. The only Maryland case in
point that has been found is Spencer v. State,8' which
reached the same dubious result as Fisher. In the Mary-
land case, Judge Bryan, dissenting, said, "If the state of
mind of an accused person is such that he was not capable
of deliberation when he committed a homicide, it cannot
make any possible difference from what cause the in-
capacity may arise."32 Judge Bryan's reasoning is sound.
It seems logically untenable to maintain, as is done in many
jurisdictions, that self-produced intoxication may be prop-
announced that "voluntary drunkenness is generally not a defense." How-
ever, it was noted that the triers of fact determined that the defendant
was not drunk at the time of the killing.
'" MODEL PENAL CODE, op. ct. supra, n. 6, 69; Weihofen and Overholser,
Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L. J. 959 (1947).
See generally WEImHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
(1954) 176-188.
828 U.S. 463 (1946). For a discussion of this case see CLARK AND
MARSHALL, op. cit. supra, n. 26, 374-6, and Taylor, Partial Insanity As
Affecting the Degree of Crime - A Commentary on Fisher v. United States,
34 Cal. L. Rev. 625 (1946).
1 Id., 466. Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting, rejected this objective
standard and argued that ". . . there are persons who, while not totally
insane, possess such low mental powers as to be incapable of the delibera-
tion and premeditation requisite to statutory first degree murder." Id., 492.
See State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P. 2d 312, 316 (1959), where, in
granting a new trial to defendant who had been convicted of first degree
murder, the court extracted the following quotation from People v. Moran,
249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928) :
"Feebleness of mind or will, even though not so extreme as to
justify a finding that the defendant is irresponsible, may properly
be considered . . . in determining whether a homicide has been
committed with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill, and may
thus be effective to reduce the grade of the offense."
Also, in People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927), there was a
reversal of a first degree murder conviction on the ground that Caruso was
too distraught to have deliberated, notwithstanding the fact that he had
time.
69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888).
mId., 48. See Recent Decision, Criminal Law - The Diminished Be-
sponsibility Doctrine, 20 Md. L. Rev. 376 (1960).
[VOL. XXI
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erly considered in deciding whether an accused deliberated
and premeditated, but that mental disease may not be so
considered. 3 The usual view that intoxication may prevent
premeditation and deliberation (like the often held view
that mental weakness short of insanity may do so) really
conflicts with the Pennsylvania rule, one tendency of which
is to hold the accused to the tort standard of the reasonable
man by permitting a finding of his guilt if the time lapse
is sufficient for the ordinary reasonable man to premeditate
and deliberate.
In summary, it might be suggested that the legislature
consider abandoning the premeditation and deliberation
criterion,84 openly leaving to the discretion of the trial
court or jury the imposing of punishment for all murder.3 5
After scrutinizing the premeditation and deliberation test,
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment reached this
conclusion, adding that when an accused is convicted of
murder the jury should be required to determine whether
there are extenuating circumstances, and, if there are
none, then the defendant should be sentenced to death.86
Also, it is recommended in the MODEL PENAL CODE that a
trial court or jury ought not to prescribe a sentence of
death unless it finds that there are aggravating circum-
stances, which are enumerated in the CODE, and, further,
that there are no substantial mitigating factors.
An alternative would be to set under the existing
statute a minimum time which must elapse between the
conception and execution of the fatal act in order to
establish premeditation and deliberation. In Belgium it
3 Keedy, supra, n. 3, 290.
1, Any abolition of degrees of murder for intentional homicides would
require reconsideration of the felony-murder rule, which in Maryland
makes homicides in the course of conduct connected with certain enumer-
ated crimes murders in the first degree, 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27,
§§ 408-410.
15 Justice Cardozo has said that:
"If intent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice,
then in truth it is always deliberate and premeditated, since choice is
involved in the hypothesis of the intent. What we have is merely
a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the
suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to
call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to
giving them this dispensing power, but it should be given to them
directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words." CARDOZO, WHAT
MEDICINE CAN Do FOR LAW (1928) in LAW AND LITERATURE (1931) 100.
Supra, n. 3, 195. "'Extenuating circumstances' would not be defined by
statute, for the same reasons for which we have found It impossible to
define degrees of murder. The decision of the jury would be within their
unfettered discretion and in no sense governed by principles of law."
81Supra, n. 6, 59-61.
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must ordinarily be shown that two or three hours expired. 8
This time test might serve to press upon the courts a con-
struction of the words premeditation and deliberation
which more nearly approximates their intended meanings.
It would, however, be extremely difficult to establish a
meaningful period of time - although probably at least
fifteen minutes ought to have elapsed.
But, for so long as the deliberation and premeditation
criterion stands in its present state,
"[H]omicide law can .. .move forward by looking
backward. By returning for guidance to the era of
literal meanings for the words with which we are
concerned, we can arrive at a more rational and
realistic result in our treatment of spur-of-the-moment
intent cases." 9
JOHN T. JOSEPH
ROYAL CoMMIssIoN, Op. Cit. 8upra, n. 3, 175.
Knudson, Murder by the Clock, 24 Wash. U. L. Q. 305, 352 (1939).
[VOL. XXI
